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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law-THE UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
AcT-State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 1977).
In 1971, the Minnesota Legislature adopted the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act' (Uniform Act). The Uniform Act was promulgated in
an attempt to coordinate drug abuse laws throughout the United
States.2 It has been adopted by forty-five states' since its promulgation
in 1970.1 The Uniform Act establishes five schedules categorizing spe-
cific controlled substances5 according to pharmacological effect and po-
tential danger to the health of the individual.' Substances listed in
Schedule I are considered to have the highest potential for abuse7 while
those listed in Schedule V are considered to be the least harmful., In
adopting the Uniform Act, the Legislature empowered the State Board
of Pharmacy (the Board) to define and regulate substances possessing
the potential for abuse according to the standards set forth in the var-
ious schedules.' Pursuant to this authority, the Board can change the
1. Compare UNIFORM CONTROLLED SuBrANcES ACT §§ 101-607 [hereinafter cited as
Uniform Acti with Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 937, 1971 Minn. Laws 1923 (amended 1973,
1974, 1976, and 1978) (codified as MINN. STAT. §§ 152.01-.20) [hereinafter cited as Minne-
sota Acti.
2. State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1977); UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note (increasing use of drugs and the presence of federal
drug control law necessitates uniform state action). See generally Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976).
3. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 47 (West Supp. 1974-1977).
4. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 145 (1973). The Act was designed to supplant the
UNIFORM NARCOTIC DRUG ACT OF 1933 and the MODEL STATE DRUG ABUSE CONTROL ACT OF
1966. Id.
5. See MINN. STAT. § 152.02(2)-(6) (1976).
6. See id. § 152.02(8).
7. See id. § 152.02, subd. 7(1). This subdivision authorizes the Board to place a sub-
stance in Schedule I if the substance has "[a] high potential for abuse, no currently
accepted medical use in the United States, and a lack of accepted safety for use under
medical supervision." Id.
8. See id. § 152.02, subd. 7(5). A substance may be placed in Schedule V if it has "[a]
low potential for abuse relative to the substances listed in Schedule IV, currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States, and a limited physical dependence and/or
psychological dependence liability relative to the substances listed in Schedule IV." Id.
9. See id. § 152.02(8), (9), (12). Subdivision 8 requires the Board to take into account
the following factors in deciding to place a substance on one of the schedules:
The actual or relative potential for abuse, the scientific evidence of its pharma-
cological effect, if known, the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the
substance, the history and current pattern of abuse, the scope, duration, and
significance of abuse, the risk to public health, the potential of the substance
to produce psychic or physiological dependence liability, and whether the sub-
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criminal penalty for possession of a substance by rescheduling that sub-
stance."'
State v. King" involved the first judicial test of the Minnesota Uni-
form Controlled Substances Act' 2 (Minnesota Act). At issue was
whether the provisions of the Minnesota Act dealing with alterations in
the schedules of controlled substances by the Board established an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power 3 and second, whether the
procedure instituted for adopting regulations resulted in a denial of due
process. 4 The defendant in King had been charged with possession of
phentermine' 5 on April 21, 1976,11 nearly two years after the Board desig-
nated it as a Schedule IV controlled substance,'7 but prior to the effec-
tive date of a legislative enactment that added phentermine to Schedule
IV." The district court dismissed the complaint against the defendant,
10. See id. § 152.15 (penalty varies depending on the classification of the controlled
substance).
11. 257 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 1977).
12. MINN. STAT. §§ 152.01-.20 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 639, 1978
Minn. Laws 418.
13. 257 N.W.2d at 695, 697.
14. Id. at 697-98. A third less controversial issue, which simply involved a careful
reading of the statute, was whether or not the Legislature had intended to delegate to the
Board the authority to add, delete, or reschedule drugs. See id. at 695-97. The question
involved a judicial reconciliation of one provision in the statute which allowed the Board
to promulgate regulations controlling substances, see MINN. STAT. § 152.02(8), (12) (1976),
and another provision which required the Board and the Advisory Council on Controlled
Substances to report annually to the Legislature and recommend changes in the law. See
id. § 152.02(13). The district court had ruled that the Legislature, by these conflicting
sections, had not intended to delegate to the Board the power to regulate controlled
substances. See 257 N.W.2d at 695-97. The supreme court disagreed, holding that subdivi-
sion 12 is a specific provision, while subdivision 13 is meant to deal with drug control
generally. Id. at 696-97.
15. Phentermine is a stimulant, chemically related to amphetamines, used for treat-
ment of obesity. See PHYsicis' DESK REFERENCE 974-75 (32d ed. 1978).
16. 257 N.W.2d at 695.
17. Phentermine was added to Schedule IV pursuant to a rule promulgated by the
Board effective on November 8, 1974. See 257 N.W.2d at 695. MINN. STAT. § 152.02(12)
(1976) provides that federal reschedulings published in the Federal Register become auto-
matically effective in Minnesota within 30 days absent a request for a hearing. After
phentermine became controlled under federal law, see 38 Fed. Reg. 18,013 (1973), the
Board, "out of an abundance of caution" gave notice to interested parties and held hear-
ings without a request. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 5. The 30-day provision
was held to constitute both a denial of due process and an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority in State v. Dougall, 89 Wash. 2d 118, 570 P.2d 135 (1977), because
the provision did not provide notice that possession of valium was a violation of Washing-
ton law and because the authority to adopt future federal regulations was an improper
delegation of legislative power. Id. at 121-23, 570 P.2d at 137-38. But see Samson v.
State, 27 Md. App. 326, 333-35, 341 A.2d 817, 822-23 (1975) (30-day provision upheld).
18. The defendant was charged with possession of phentermine on April 21, 1976, see
257 N.W.2d at 695, only one day after approval of a law placing the drug on Schedule IV.
See Act of Apr. 20, 1976, ch. 338, § 4, 1976 Minn. Laws 1349 (amending MINN. STAT. §
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holding that the Legislature had neither the intent nor the constitu-
tional power to delegate to an administrative agency the authority to
add controlled substances to the statutory schedules."9 Moreover, the
court ruled that possession of phentermine did not constitute a crime
because the drug had not been declared "controlled" by the Legislature
and, therefore, the defendant was not on notice that possession was
illegal.2 0 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state
constitution did not prevent the Legislature from delegating its power
to schedule narcotic substances to the Board 2' and that the conviction
was proper because all citizens are presumed to know what the law
prohibits.
22
In addressing the delegation issue, the Minnesota court referred to
previously established standards used to determine the validity of legis-
lative grants of power to the executive branch. Prior decisions indicate
that the discretion to determine when and upon whom a law shall take
effect is a purely legislative power that may not be delegated to an
administrative agency.3 However, the power to ascertain a fact, the
finding of which will make the law operative, may properly be dele-
152.02(5) (1974)). Because the amendment to the Minnesota Act was silent regarding date
of effectiveness, it became effective on August 1, 1976. See MnN. STAT. § 645.02 (1976)
(unless law states otherwise, all statutes become effective on the next August first follow-
ing enactment). The rationale for adding phentermine to the statutory schedule when the
drug was already controlled pursuant to a regulation was an unwritten legislative practice
designed to ease an apparent police enforcement problem by placing the entire schedule
of controlled substances in a single source. Interview with David E. Holmstrom, Executive
Secretary of the Minnesota Board of Pharmacy, in St. Paul (Dec. 22, 1978). The reasoning
behind this practice raises serious due process questions regarding the presumption that
all are bound to know the law. If law enforcement agencies have difficulty finding the
statutes they are charged with enforcing, is it constitutionally proper to presume that all
citizens, who have even less access to the law, are aware of the law? For full discussion of
the notice issue, see notes 43-75 infra and accompanying text.
19. 257 N.W.2d at 695.
20. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix at A-15 to -16.
21. 257 N.W.2d at 697; see MiN. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (separation of powers).
22. 257 N.W.2d at 697-98.
23. See, e.g., State v. Mathiasen, 273 Minn. 372, 378, 141 N.W.2d 805, 810 (1966) (what
constitutes a crime is within legislative province); McGuire v. Viking Tool & Die Co., 258
Minn. 336, 348, 104 N.W.2d 519, 528 (1960) ("It is axiomatic that an administrative body
can neither make nor change substantive law. It may adopt administrative rules, but in
doing so cannot change existing, or make new, law.") (quoting Bielke v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 206 Minn. 308, 312, 288 N.W. 584, 586 (1939)); Hassler v. Engberg, 233 Minn.
487, 515, 48 N.W.2d 343, 359 (1951) (legislative power may not be delegated); State v.
Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 292-98, 37 N.W.2d 3, 8-12 (1949) (judiciary may not encroach on
exclusively legislative power to fix and determine punishment for violation of the law;
legislature may not interfere in judicial function of imposing sentence); Lee v. Delmont,
228 Minn. 101, 112, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538 (1949) (purely legislative power may not be
delegated unless authorized by constitution); State v. Sobelman, 199 Minn. 232, 235, 271
N.W. 484, 485 (1937) (exclusive province of legislature to declare what acts constitute a
crime); State v. Bean, 199 Minn. 16, 20, 270 N.W. 918, 920 (1937) (same).
19791
3
et al.: Administrative Law—The Uniform Controlled Substances Act—State v.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
gated."4 In such a case, the court has held that the Legislature may
declare a law to be operative only upon the subsequent establishment
of a fact, and when the law does take effect, it is by force of legislative
action as if the Legislature had fixed the time for its becoming effec-
tive.2 In addition, for a legislative delegation to be valid, a reasonably
clear policy or standard of action must control the agency in ascertain-
ing the facts so that the law takes effect by virtue of its own terms and
not according to the whims of the agency. 6 What is a sufficiently defi-
nite standard may vary according to the complexity of the subject to
which the law applies.Y The court has recognized that in some circum-
stances it may be impossible for the Legislature to deal directly with the
many complex details of a particular subject. 2' The vital distinction to
be drawn is between an unconstitutional delegation of power to make a
law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be,
and a valid cession of authority or discretion as to what action should
24. See, e.g., Hassler v. Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 515, 48 N.W.2d 343, 360 (1951) (legisla-
ture may delegate power to determine fact upon which the operation of the law depends);
Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 113, 36 N.W.2d 530,538 (1949) (same); Williams v. Evans,
139 Minn. 32, 41-42, 165 N.W. 495, 497 (1917) (legislature may declare laws operative only
upon subsequent establishment of some fact).
25. See, e.g., Hassler v. Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 515, 48 N.W.2d 343, 360-61 (1951)
(administrative officers may exercise discretion according to conditions imposed by legis-
lature); Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 113, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538 (1949) (delegation is valid
when law takes effect by its own terms); Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 42, 165 N.W.
495, 497 (1917) (when valid rule takes effect it is by force of legislative action as if
legislature had acted).
26. See Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 311, 126 N.W.2d 778,
780 (1964) (application of laws must not depend upon whim of administrative officer, but
upon facts determined by administrative officer within clear, controlling policy of law);
Reyburn v. Minnesota State Bd. of Optometry, 247 Minn. 520, 523, 78 N.W.2d 351, 354
(1956) (same); Dimke v. Finke, 209 Minn. 29, 37, 295 N.W. 75, 80 (1940) (same).
27. See, e.g., Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 311-15, 126
N.W.2d 778, 780-83 (1964) (flexible and practical guide, not rigid standard, is necessary
for "habitual violator" standard); State ex rel. Brown v. Johnson, 255 Minn. 134, 140, 96
N.W.2d 9, 14 (1959) (flexible standards may be necessary to carry out legislative policy
where rigid standards could destroy administrative flexibility necessary to enforce the
law); Johnson v. Richardson, 197 Minn. 266, 273, 266 N.W. 867, 871 (courts will uphold
laws where legislature defines general policy and leaves to an agency adaptation of such
policy to varying conditions), appeal dismissed per curiam sub nom. Tornius v. Johnson,
299 U.S. 508 (1936).
28. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Krebes, 303 Minn. 219, 223-24, 226 N.W.2d 617,
620-21 (1975) (quoting Anderson and Lee); Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267
Minn. 308, 311-13, 126 N.W.2d 778, 780-82 (1964) (term "habitual violator" held sufficient
guide; modem tendency is to be more liberal in grants of discretion to facilitate adminis-
tration of laws under increasingly complex economic and governmental conditions); Rey-
burn v. Minnesota State Bd. of Optometry, 247 Minn. 520, 526, 78 N.W.2d 351, 356 (1956)
(term "unprofessional conduct" provides sufficient standard for Board in revoking li-
censes); Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101,113,36 N.W.2d 530,539 (1949) ("Legislation must
often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the legisla-
ture cannot deal directly.").
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be taken within the letter of the law.3
As applied to the Uniform Act, these standards" have led several
jurisdictions to uphold the delegation of power to schedule substances,
while a minority of state courts confronting the issue have found the
delegation to be unconstitutional. The minority view holds that the
Uniform Act unlawfully delegates to regulatory agencies the authority
to define a crime and the authority to establish its punishment.3' Ac-
cording to the minority position, any republishing of controlled sub-
stance schedules with additions or changes creates a new crime. 32 The
weakness in this position is that it takes too narrow a view of the statute.
Under the Uniform Act, the agency does not define what conduct consti-
tutes a crime33-the legislature makes that determination when it
adopts the statute by deciding that the use of certain substances with
defined effects should be illegal."4 Therefore, lacking the technical ex-
pertise to determine which substances have the defined effects, the Leg-
29. Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 42, 165 N.W. 495, 497 (1917).
30. The standards used to determine whether a legislative body has impermissibly
delegated its power are similar across the nation and were developed in a series of land-
mark United States Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 426 (1935) (Congress may give authorization to determine facts and may estab-
lish primary standards leaving an agency to "fill up the details."); Hampton & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (Congress must lay down "an intelligible princi-
ple" by which the agency is directed to conform); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506,
517 (1911) (content of legislatively declared crime may be filled in by admimistrative
agency thus allowing criminal sanction for violation of administrative rules or regula-
tions); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693-94 (1892) (legislature may not delegate its exclu-
sive power to make a law, but it may delegate the authority to determine a fact upon which
the law makes its own action depend); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (legislature has exclusive authority to define crime and
ordain its punishment); Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813)
(President may determine a fact which makes the law operative).
31. Of the 45 states which have adopted the Uniform Act, only nine, other than Minne-
sota, have been faced with the delegation issue. Two states have adopted the minority
view. See Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 774, 781 (Miss. 1974); State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d
683, 687-90 (Utah 1977). Seven jurisdictions have upheld their versions of the Uniform Act
when confronted with the same issue. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
32. See Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 774, 781 (Miss. 1974) (attempted delegation to
reschedule controlled substances changed punishment for possession of substances from
that fixed by legislature and thus violated separation of powers provision of the state
constitution); State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977) (authorizing attorney gen-
eral to add, delete, or reschedule substances was unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power).
33. Compare State v. Cutright, 193 Neb. 303, 306-07, 226 N.W.2d 771, 774 (1975)
(legislature defined crime and established penalty for its violation) and MtN. STAT. §§
152.09, .15 (1976) (same) with Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 782-83, 104
N.W.2d 227, 230-31 (1960) (agency given absolute power to define crime).
34. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 152.02(7), (9) (1976) (specific criteria to be followed by
agency in exercising its authority to regulate and define additional controlled substances).
See also State v. Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127, 132 (Minn. 1979) (major concern of Legislature in
adopting Uniform Act was the morphological effects of drug use).
5
et al.: Administrative Law—The Uniform Controlled Substances Act—State v.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
islature acts properly when it authorizes a panel of experts to make that
determination.
3 1
The Minnesota court in King followed the majority position :" and held
that the Legislature had not delegated the authority to enact criminal
law to the Board. 37 The addition of phentermine to the list of controlled
substances was regarded as a properly delegated finding of fact. "  This
grant of authority to the Board is a constitutional delegation of discre-
tionary power within limited, well-defined standards governing addition
to the statutory lists.3 9 Furthermore, the court stated that the additions
are made within the framework of detailed rulemaking procedures. 0 The
court found that the Legislature, in adopting the Minnesota Act, had
made possession of those chemical substances that posed a health haz-
ard to society a crime and then placed responsibility for determining
which substances should be added to the schedules with the Board.4'
Because the Legislature had defined the crime and had set specific
criteria for determining what types of drugs should be controlled, the
Board was merely in a position to regulate the drug within legislatively
defined parameters."2
35. The State Board of Pharmacy was designed to be an expert panel. It consists of
seven members, five of whom must be pharmacists actively participating in the practice
of pharmacy. In addition, the five required pharmacists must have been engaged in at
least five consecutive years of practice as pharmacists immediately preceding appoint-
ment to the Board. See MINN. STAT. § 151.02 (1976).
36. See Cassell v. State, 55 Ala. App. 502, 507-08, 317 So. 2d 348, 354-55 (1975); People
v. Avery, 67 11. 2d 182, 186-87, 367 N.E.2d 79, 80-81 (1977); People v. Uriel, 76 Mich. App.
102, 105-08, 255 N.W.2d 788, 791 (1977); State v. Lisk, 21 N.C. App. 474, 477, 204 S.E.2d
868, 870, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 666, 207 S.E.2d 759 (1974); State v. Brown, 576 P.2d 776,
777-78 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); Hilton v. State, 503 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tenn. 1973);
Threlkeld v. State, 558 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
37. See 257 N.W.2d at 697. The equivalent federal law, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976), has been challenged on
the same ground. Cases resolving the issue have held that Congress made a proper delega-
tion of discretion to the Attorney General. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840,
843-44 (9th Cir. 1977) (federal act contains sufficient guidelines and standards), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 939-41 (2d Cir. 1977)
(regulation controlling phentermine and phendimetrazine upheld because delegation
made pursuant to clearly expressed statement of congressional policy and governed by
precise standards rooted in that policy); United States v. Piatti, 416 F. Supp. 1202, 1205-
06 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (same for regulation controlling methaqualone).
38. See 257 N.W.2d at 695, 697.
39. See 257 N.W.2d at 697; note 36 supra.
40. See, e.g., 257 N.W.2d at 695. Board rules are promulgated in compliance with
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. See MINN. STAT. §§ 15.01-.52 (1976 &
Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 14, 1978, ch. 480, § 1, 1978 Minn. Laws 84, as
amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 592, 1978 Minn. Laws 327, as amended by Act of
Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 674, §§ 2-3, 1978 Minn. Laws 494, as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978,
ch. 790, 1978 Minn. Laws 1155.
41. See 257 N.W.2d at 697.
42. The fact that the Minnesota Act deals with a difficult and controversial area of the
law may be viewed as a significant factor for its constitutionality being upheld. The
[Vol. 5
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The second issue in King related to the due process requirement of
notice. 3 The defendant contended that she had been denied due process
because phentermine was not specifically listed as a controlled sub-
stance in the Minnesota Act at the time the charges were filed." The
court rejected this contention, holding that the defendant was charged
supreme court stated it would "view legislative delegations liberally in order to facilitate
the administration of laws which, like drug control, are complex in their application." 257
N.W.2d at 697.
43. See id. at 697-98. The due process issue has been discussed in other jurisdictions
which have adopted the Uniform Act. See State v. Gula, 320 A.2d 752, 757-58 (Del. 1974)
(failure to publish regulations as required by statute did not invalidate indictment);
People v. Avery, 67 II1. 2d 182, 188, 367 N.E.2d 79, 81 (1977) (statute as it existed before
amendment invalid for failure to require due process); Samson v. State, 27 Md. App. 326,
333-35, 341 A.2d 817, 823 (1975) (raised due process issue, but involved 30-day provision
for incorporation of federal rules and regulations; ignorance of the law is no excuse); Hilton
v. State, 503 S.W.2d 951, 954-55 (Tenn. 1973) (statute upheld); State v. Dougall, 89
Wash. 2d 118, 121-22, 570 P.2d 135, 137-38 (1977) (30-day provision found unconstitu-
tional because lack of due process); cf. Cassell v. State, 55 Ala. App. 502, 507-08, 317 So.
2d- 348, 354-55 (1975) (statute requires that rules be published in newspaper of general
circulation). Courts have ruled that widespread publication of a regulation constitutes
sufficient notice to avoid a due process objection. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947) (publication in the Federal Register is constructive
notice to all persons); State v. Gula, 320 A.2d 752, 757 (Del. 1974) (noting widespread
news media publicity of those who have been prosecuted under the regulation); Cass,
Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 671, 699 n.163
(1976) (publication in the Code of Federal Regulations gives sufficient notice of what
regulation prohibits) (citing United States v. Freeman, No. 75-2183 (4th Cir. Mar. 4,
1976)). But see Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 387 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) ("lit is an absurdity to hold that every farmer who insures his crops knows
what the Federal Register contains . . . . If he were to peruse this voluminous and dull
publication. . . he would never need crop insurance, for he would never get time to plant
any crops."). The issue may have been rendered moot in Minnesota because of subse-
quent amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act, applicable to the Minnesota
Act through Mlme4. STAT. § 152.02(12) (1976). Legislation enacted in 1974 requires that
administrative regulations be published in the State Register, thus eliminating the notice
objection. See Act of Mar. 28, 1974, ch. 344, §§ 4-7, 1974 Minn. Laws 577, as amended by
Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380, § 2, 1975 Minn. Laws 1288 (amending MINN. STAT. § 15.0413
(1) (1974)). However, the amendment was not effective until July 1, 1976, see Act of
June 4, 1975, ch. 380, § 2, 1975 Minn. Laws 1288 (amending MIN. STAT. § 15.0413(1)
(1974)), after charges had been filed against the defendant. See 257 N.W.2d at 695.
Legislative intent regarding applicability of amendments to the Administrative Procedure
Act is confusing because of reference in the Minnesota Act to the 1969 and 1971 versions
of the Administrative Procedure Act. See MINN. STAT. § 152.02(12) (1976). Thus, under
rules of construction, see id. § 645.31(2) (where act adopts another law by reference, it
also adopts subsequent amendments to that law, unless there is clear contrary legisla-
tive intent), publication in the State Register may not be required by the Minnesota Act
because specific mention of the 1969 and 1971 statutes may be considered an indication
of legislative intent not to adopt subsequent amendments to the Administrative Procedure
Act. Although controlled substance regulations have been published in the state register,
see 7 M.C.A.R. § 8.051(D) (1978) (rules of the Board of Pharmacy), some revision of the
Minnesota Act is sorely needed to clarify this situation,
44. 257 N.W.2d at 697-98; see note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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with knowledge of the duly promulgated Board regulation that prohib-
ited possession of the substance. 5 Furthermore, phentermine had been
controlled under federal law." In a dissenting opinion, Justice Otis
argued that the statutory procedures set out in the Minnesota Act did
not constitute notice "in practical effect."4 7 He reasoned that it was
unrealistic to expect laymen to discover regulations in such obscure
places as the offices of the Secretary of State and the Commissioner of
Administration." However, the majority did not recognize the defen-
dant's claim that such lack of notice, and therefore ignorance of a valid
regulation, would excuse her violation of the law."9
The doctrine ignorantia juris non excusat0 is deeply entrenched in our
legal tradition." Although the doctrine does not presume that all have
read the law, it does hold all citizens responsible for knowledge of basic
principles which are held to convey adequate warning that certain con-
duct is illegal.2 While its origins are obscure, 3 the maxim remains quite
durable.5' Developed in an era that had yet to conceive of government
45. See id. at 697-98. The fact that the regulation was not published and widely circu-
lated did not affect the court's reasoning. See id. at 698 (Otis, J., dissenting). However,
as Professor Davis has observed, unpublished regulations are often difficult to find due to
uncooperative clerks and inadequate filing and indexing systems in many offices of secre-
taries of state. See 1 K. DAVIs, AD M IsTRAinv LAW TR I is. § 6.11, at 400 (1958).
46. See 257 N.W.2d at 698; 38 Fed. Reg. 18,013 (1973).
47. 257 N.W.2d at 698 (Otis, J., dissenting).
48. See id. The Legislature acknowledged a notice defect in the procedure for control-
ling drugs when it added phentermine to the statutory schedule, after the drug was already
controlled in an administrative regulation, for the purpose of simplifying police enforce-
ment by locating the schedule in a single source. Interview with David E. Holmstrom,
Executive Secretary of the Minnesota Board of Pharmacy, in St. Paul (Dec. 22, 1978).
49. See 257 N.W.2d at 697-98.
50. "Illgnorance of the law excuses not." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 881 (rev. 4th ed.
1968).
51. See O'Connor, Mistake and Ignorance in Criminal Cases, 39 MoD. L, REv. 644
(1976). See also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 (1765)
("[hlf ignorance, of wtat he might know, were admitted as a legitimate excuse, the laws
would be of no effect, but might always be eluded with impunity.") (emphasis in original).
52. See, e.g., State v. McCorvey, 262 Minn. 361, 365-66, 114 N.W.2d 703, 706 (1962)
(statute will not fail for indefiniteness if "person of common intelligence could determine
its meaning with reasonable certainty"); Powers v. Owen, 419 P.2d 277, 279 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1966) (while ignorance is no excuse, our concept of due process does not expect
citizens to employ counsel to search applicable laws in varying localities to determine if
certain conduct is unlawful); Hilton v. State, 503 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tenn. 1973) (persons
of common intelligence and understanding should comprehend that it is unlawful to sell
controlled substances such as L.S.D.); State v. Dougall, 89 Wash. 2d 118, 121-22, 570
P.2d 135, 137-38 (19;7) (unreasonable to expect average person to continually research
Federal Register to learn what substances are controlled); Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake
in the Criminal Law, 22 HAev. L. Rev. 75, 91 (1908) (presumption that all know the law
is "absurd").
53. No single case can be pointed to which directly established the maxim. See
O'Connor, supra note 51, at 646.
54. See, e.g., United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563
[Vol. 5
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by agency, the maxim has not been modified in recent-times to take into
account the distinctions between the passage of a statute and the pro-
mulgation of an administrative regulation.5 Recent commentary has
(1971) (general rule upheld); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910)
("ignorance of the law will not excuse"); cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957)
(due process requirement of notice limits application of the doctrine).
55. Apart from additional press coverage attendant upon the legislative process, the
Minnesota Constitution establishes certain standards which the Legislature must follow
in the conduct of its business. For examples relevant to due process notice requirements,
see MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 14 (sessions open to the public); id. § 15 (publication of journals
of proceedings of each house); id. § 16 (publication of voting results in respective journals);
id. § 17 (laws may embrace only one subject, which must be expressed in their titles); id.
§ 19 (three reportings of a bill prior to passage in either house). In addition, the Legislature
has provided for the publication and distribution of at least one copy of Minnesota Laws
and Minnesota Statutes to every county in the state. See MINN. STAT. §§ 648.11, .14, .31-
.37, .39 (1976 & Supp. 1977). Under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, as it
existed at the time of defendant's arrest, state agencies had authority to promulgate rules
to the extent that power had been vested in an agency by statute. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957,
ch. 806, § 2(1), 1957 Minn. Laws 1100 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(1) (1976
& Supp. 1977)). Prior to adoption of a rule by an agency, the statute required a public
hearing, with 30 days notice of the hearing to those individuals, groups, or association
representatives who were registered with the Secretary of State for that purpose. See Act
of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 806, § 2(4), 1957 Minn. Laws 1100 (current version at MINN. STAT. §
15.0412(4) (1976 & Supp. 1977)). Amendment, suspension, or repeal of such regulations
could follow this procedure; but if the agency chose not to hold a hearing, it was required
to publish or circulate notice of its intended action and allow interested persons to submit
data or views orally or in writing. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 806, § 2(3), 1957 Minn.
Laws 1100 (amended 1974). Under the statute, an agency was required to show need for
the rule; and, upon adoption by an agency, the form and legality of the proposed regula-
tion were subject to the approval or disapproval of the Attorney General. See Act of Apr.
27, 1957, ch. 806, § 2(4), 1957 Minn. Laws 1100 (current version at MINN. STAT. §
15.0412(4) (1976 & Supp. 1977)). Following hearing and approval by the agency and the
Attorney General, such regulations were given the "force and effect of law" upon filing in
the offices of the Secretary of State and the Commissioner of Administration. See Act of
Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 806, § 3(1), 1957 Minn. Laws 1100, as amended by Act of May 22, 1963,
ch. 822, § 1(1), 1963 Minn. Laws 1444 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.0413(1) (1976)).
Annual publication and distribution of all rules and regulations were required of the
Commissioner of Administration. See Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 822, § 1(5), 1963 Minn.
Laws 1444 (repealed 1975). Thus, while the 1974 version of the Administrative Procedure
Act provided for notice of promulgation of agency rules, such notice was effectively limited
to parties who were registered with the Secretary of State or who were otherwise involved
in agency proceedings. Modification of the statute in 1974, requiring publication of regula-
tions promulgated after July. 1, 1976 in a weekly state register, and elimination of the
compulsory filing with the Commissioner of Administration, may have removed any po-
tential notice problems in the rule-making process. See note 43 supra. Despite these
differences, ignorantia juris non excusat has been widely applied without modification to
both statutory enactments, see, e.g., United States v. International Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971); Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833);
State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29, 38 (1878), and to regulations adopted by administrative
bodies. See, e.g., Doing v. District of Columbia, 67 A.2d 396, 398 (D.C. 1949) (presumption
of knowledge of the law applies to traffic regulations promulgated by district commission-
ers); cf. City of Bloomington v. Munson, 300 Minn. 195, 200, 221 N.W.2d 787, 791 (1974)
9
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questioned whether this historical development requires that the doc-
trine be viewed as a time-honored rule or simply as a trite adage."'
Commentators have argued that such an irrebutable presumption is too
unbending, hindering rather than advancing justice in some cases. 7
However, these critics do not offer a practical alternative. '  Anything
but rigid adherence to the principle may, in the end, work the most
severe injustice. 9
Despite endurance of the maxim, an equally time-honored con-
cept-due process-places some constraints on the operation of the
rule. '" The due process doctrine of vagueness requires statutes to give
(respondents charged with knowledge of provisions of city home rule charter); Labruce v.
City of North Charleston, 268 S.C. 465, 467, 234 S.E.2d 866, 867 (1977) (knowledge of city
ordinances presumed). See also People v. Avery, 67 Ill. 2d 182, 367 N.E.2d 79 (1977) (law
providing no hearing or publication of regulations promulgated under the Uniform Act
found unconstitutional). The court in Avery stated:
[OIn legislative enactments, notice-as the term is ordinarily employed-is
not required. But notice does in fact occur, for it is constitutionally required that
"[al bill shall be read by title on three different days in each house" (Ill. Const.
1970, art. IV, sec. 8(d)). . . . Under [the statute], no notice is required. A rule
issued at noon on any given day could be enforced the same day. The legislature
itself, had it not delegated the power, could not accomplish this result.
Id. at 188, 367 N.E.2d at 81.
56. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 43; Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Lau), 88
U. PA. L. Rxv. 35 (1939).
57. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565
(1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[Infliction of criminal punishment upon the unaware
has long troubled the fair administration of justice."). However, commentators admit the
maxim may occasionally work injustice. See, e.g., Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Crimi-
nal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 36-38 (1957); Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8
U. Cm. L. REv. 641, 648-51 (1941).
58. Professor Mueller has suggested that a "distinction should be made between excus-
able and unexcusable. . . unawareness of wrongfulness." See Mueller, On Common Law
Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L.'REv. 1043, 1104 (1958). Another commentator has suggested
application of a rational connection test similar to that used to test the validity of an
irrebuttable presumption. Failure to meet the standard would be a denial of due process.
See Cass, supra note 43, at 691-92. For cases illustrating the rational connection test in
the irrebuttable presumption context, see Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969)
(fact presumed by the law must be more likely than not to flow from proved fact on which
it depends); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (validity of statutory presump-
tion depends on a "rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed"). A more workable suggestion was made by Rollin M. Perkins who observed
that, although logic indicates that the maxim should be eliminated, logic must sometimes
give way to the practicalities involved in leaving the doctrine intact. See Perkins, supra
note 56, at 40-41.
59. See People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 176, 31 P. 45, 47 (1892) (if a person could shield
himself behind a plea of ignorance, plea would be universally made and immunity would
result); State v. O'Neill, 147 Iowa 513, 519, 126 N.W. 454, 456 (1910) ("One who is bound
to obey the law should not be allowed to say that he was ignorant of it."); O.W. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 47-48 (1881) (allowing a defense of ignorance would encourage ignorance
of the law).
60. The doctrine of vagueness may limit application of the maxim. See note 61 infra.
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notice that the particular conduct engaged in is prohibited.6' The United
States Supreme Court has also ruled that in some instances actual
knowledge of the law and subsequent failure to comply are necessary
before a conviction will stand." In cases of controlled substances, how-
ever, the courts have been less willing to apply due process as a limita-
tion on application of the doctrine.63 Persons that knowingly possess
dangerous or deleterious substances consistently have been deemed
aware of the great probability of regulation."
Because, according to existing case law, the doctrine is especially
viable in regulatory schemes involving drugs, "" the threshold question in
Due process requires actual notice of the law in cases of statutes prohibiting acts of
omission. See note 62 infra. In addition, bona fide reliance on administrative decisions or
advice, or on statutory or decisional law, and requirements of intent and knowing action
may create exceptions to the rule. See Perkins, supra note 56, at 41-51.
61. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (vagrancy statute
void for vagueness since one would have to guess at what conduct is forbidden); United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (there should not be criminal responsibility for
conduct which one could not reasonably understand to be proscribed); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids."); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[AI
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.").
62. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (in the case of registration laws
and other laws where an act of omission constitutes a criminal offense, due process re-
quires notice so one may have an adequate opportunity to defend oneself); United States
v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556, 558-59 (2d Cir. 1970) (citing Lambert; when applying law
requiring registration for convicted drug users before going overseas, user's knowledge of
law required; otherwise, no useful end served in punishing violators or incarcerating those
who would obey if they knew of the law).
63. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (introducing adulter-
ated drugs into commerce); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922) (case
involving sale of drugs; "[Wihere one deals with others and his mere negligence may be
dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or poison, the policy of the law may . ..
require the punishment of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious
character of what he sells.").
64. See United States v. International Mineral & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)
(sulfuric acid; where dangerous products or obnoxious waste materials are being shipped,
probability of regulation so great that anyone in possession of them must be deemed aware
of regulation). See also United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609-10 (1971) (hand gren-
ades); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (introducing adulterated
drugs into commerce); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922) (drugs); United
States v. Weiler, 458 F.2d 474, 477-80 (3d Cir. 1972) (statute prohibiting convicted felons
from transporting firearms upheld; distinguished from Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957) and likened to Balint); United States v. Crow, 439 F.2d 1193, 1195-96 (9th Cir.
1971) (registration requirement for firearms distinguished from Lambert); United States
v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 519-20 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (pesticides).
65. In United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-53 (1922), the Court dealt with a taxing
statute which outlawed the sale of certain drugs. The Court observed that in the case of
some regulatory schemes designed to promote social betterment, individuals have the
burden of finding out what the law is at the peril of punishment. See id. at 252-53. This
doctrine has recently been expanded beyond drugs. See note 64 supra.
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King was whether a person of reasonable intelligence could determine
that the Minnesota Act conveyed a sufficiently definite warning that
phentermine was controlled. Although a reading of the schedules of
prohibited drugs in the Minnesota Act easily could have confused and
misled the defendant as to the status of phentermine," the court has
held that the statutes should be read as a whole to determine their
meaning and effect." Two methods for controlling drugs are provided by
the Minnesota Act: upon amendment of the statute by the Legislature
after Board recommendation" or by action of the Board itself." The
Minnesota Act expressly gives notice of the grant of power to the Board
to add substances to the schedules.7 0 It also refers to the Administrative
Procedure Act,7 which states the place where regulations adopted by
administrative agencies must be filed." Thus, had the defendant looked
at the Minnesota Act as a whole, she would have been advised that the
Board's lists of controlled substances were required to be filed in the
Secretary of State's office in accordance with the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.73 Because the Minnesota Act indicates that the substances
66. See 257 N.W.2d at 698 (Otis, J., dissenting) (defendant would have been
"thoroughly misled ... had she looked for guidelines in our statutes" because the statute
had been amended to add phentermine on the day before the defendant was charged,
effective several months hence, making it unreasonable to expect defendant to search for
the regulation operative at the time of her arrest).
67. See, e.g., State v. McCorvey, 262 Minn. 361, 365, 114 N.W.2d 703, 706 (1962)
(statute should be read as a whole to determine legislative intent); Governmental Re-
search Bureau, Inc. v. St. Louis County, 258 Minn. 350, 353-54, 104 N.W.2d 411, 413
(1960) ("The words of a statute are not to be isolated, and their meaning must be found
in the context and purpose of the statute as a whole."); Kollodge v. F. & L. Appliances,
Inc., 248 Minn. 357, 360, 80 N.W.2d 62, 64 (1956) (provision of statute cannot be taken
out of context but must be read with related provisions to determine its meaning); Merrill,
Cowles & Co. v. Shaw, 5 Minn. 148, 150 (Gil. 113, 115) (1860) (all provisions of statute
must be considered together and every provision in statute must be given its designed
effect without abrogating effect of another controlling provision); MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2)
(1976) ("The legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.").
68. MINN. STAT. § 152.02(13) (1976).
69. Id. § 152.02(7)-(9), (12).
70. See id. § 152.02(7).(9), (12)-(13).
71. Id. §§ 15.01-.52 (1976 & Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 14, 1978, ch. 480,
§ 1, 1978 Minn. Laws 84, as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 592, 1978 Minn. Laws
327, as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 674, §§ 2-3, 1978 Minn. Laws 494, as
amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 790, 1978 Minn. Laws 1155. The reference in the
Minnesota Act to the Administrative Procedure Act states: "In exercising the authority
granted by Laws 1971, Chapter 937, the state board of pharmacy shall be subject to the
provisions of Minnesota Statutes 1969, Chapter 15." MINN. STAT. § 152.02(12) (1976).
72. MINN. STAT. § 15.0413(1) (1976 & Supp. 1977) (rules or regulations filed with the
Secretary of State and approved by the Attorney General have force and effect of law after
publication in State Register).
73. Id. At the time the phentermine regulation was promulgated, regulations had to be
filed in the Commissioner of Administration's office as well as the office of the Secretary
of State. See Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 822, § 1, 1963 Minn. Laws 1444, as amended by
Act of Mar. 28, 1974, ch. 344, § 4, 1974 Minn. Laws 578 (repealed 1975). However, when
[Vol. 5
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listed in the schedules may not be the only drugs controlled, and directs
citizens to where additional controlled substances are listed, the law
provides sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited.
Although the issues discussed by Justice Otis raise serious questions
concerning the rigid application of ignorantia juris non excusat in the
context of promulgation of rules and regulations by administrative agen-
cies, it is doubtful that an effective and simple alternative could be
found which would work less hardship than the original doctrine. The
facts in King do not indicate that the defendant could not have received
adequate notice of the proscribed conduct." In fact, based on the law
as previously applied, 5 and the defendant's own actions," it would ap-
pear that she had notice that possession of phentermine was illegal.
In upholding the constitutionality of the Minnesota Act and declining
to accept a defense based on non-publication of administrative regula-
tions, the King court adhered to well-established principles of law. Si-
multaneously, the national legislative impetus designed to deal with the
growing problems of drug abuse in a uniform manner was judicially
approved in Minnesota.
Commercial Law-REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE UNDER U.C.C.
§ 2-608-Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn.
1977).
In recent years, the plight of the consumer purchaser of a defective
product has improved steadily.' By abolishing the requirement of priv-
ity, some courts have permitted disappointed purchasers to sue parties
in the sales chain of distribution other than the immediate seller for
damages.' Courts also have permitted buyers to revoke acceptance of
defective goods under section 2-608 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) and return the goods to their immediate sellers. 3 In Durfee v.
the defendant was charged, the law simply required filing in the office of the Secretary of
State. See MINN. STAT. § 15.0413(1) (1976 & Supp. 1977).
74. See text accompanying notes 43-73 supra.
75. See notes 50-73 supra and accompanying text.
76. See 257 N.W.2d at 698 n.4 (defendant may have shown culpability by concealing
the drug in her undergarments).
1. See Spannaus, Book Review, 4 WM. MrrcHEL L. Rav. 493, 493 (1978) (reviewing R.
HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA CONSUMER LAW HANDBOOK (1977)).
2. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967);
Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 558-62, 99 N.W.2d 670, 680-82 (1959); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 413, 161 A.2d 69, 99-100 (1960).
3. See, e.g., Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So.
2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1972); Jacobs v. Metro
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 (1972).
Section 2-608 of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.) provides:
19791
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